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1. INTRCl>UCTION 
During the past two decades, there has been a gro,ring consensus both 
on the usefulness of social cost-benefit analysis for project and 
expenditure evaluation in developing economies, and on the general 
procedures by which shadow prices should be deterainecl. If a nn project 
is viewed as a perturbation in the economy, then its consequences (and 
hence the shadow prices) depend critically on the salient features of the 
economy. For instance, if the economy is open to foreign trade and there 
are tariffs, then the induced changes in domestic demand and supply of 
goods affect the public revenue from tariffs. If, on the other hand, the 
economy is closed, then there are general equilibrium changes in domestic 
prices which, in turn, affect the welfare of various individuals in the 
economy. It is important, therefore, to identify the relevant structure 
of the economy. 
The fact that we are interested in social cost-benefit analysis 
indicates a belief that market prices may not accurately reflect social 
costs, that is, there are some important distortions in the econ011y which 
need to be explicitly identified. Moreover, reasonable individuals 111ay 
differ over the appropriate social welfare function and, hence, on the 
appropriate social weights (which should be auociated with the aains and 
loans to different individuals and to the government) to be employed in 
aggregating the full consequences of a project. Therefore, the role of 
social weights in determining shadow prices neecls to be clearly 
distinguished from the role of the critical structural features of the 
economy. 
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This paper focusses on shadow wage determination,1 and it makes two 
contributions. First, it emphasizes certain features of the economy which 
have important consequences for the shadow ,rage in many U>Cs, but which 
have not received the attention they deserve. Among them are the internal 
structure of the agricultural and the industrial sectors, the 
international trade environ.aent, and the mechanism which equilibrates the 
economy to the perturbation caused by the new project. (Our modelling of 
these features is discussed below.) Second, we develop a framework to 
identify those reduced fora parameters which capture the iq,act that 
2various critical features of the economy have on the shadow wage. Our 
formulae for the shadow wage can, therefore, be specialized to a variety 
of technological, behavioral and institutional hypotheses. 
Indeed, one of the lessons that has been learned in the past two 
decades is that there is enormous diversity within LDCs, and a set of 
specific assumptions which may be appropriate for one country will not be 
appropriate for others. That is precisely why it is important to 
construct a general framework, which includes as special cases all of the 
co1D111only discussed hypotheses. We, therefore, do not argue here whether 
there is or is not industrial unemployment, whether the level of 
industrial unemployment is or is not affected by employment decisions in 
the industrial sector; whether migration of agricultural workers to the 
industrial sector is or is not well described by the Barris-Todaro 
hypothesis; whether there is surplus land or surplus labor in the 
agricultural sector; whether the agricultural population is relatively 
homogenous or there are ,ride disparities within this population; whether 
the government does or does not set tariffs at optimal levels. Instead. 
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we show how the same formulae for the shadow wage can be specialized to 
these and other hypotheses, and examine what iq,lication this has, in 
turn. on the magnitude of the shadow wage. 
We derive a number of new results concerning the qualitative 
relationship between the shadow wage and the aartet wage. Many of these 
results are robust; that is, they are valid for a wide ran1e of 
uderlying parameter values. The importance of robustness Ues in the 
fact that obtaining the precise nuaerical estimates for some of the 
critical parameters is often difficult. In addition, we have been able to 
synthesize the previous wort on shadow wages. and to obtain previously 
known results as particular specializations of our more general approach. 
This synthesis helps to identify the precise sources of difference among 
the existing results. 
The main components of our framework are the following. 
(i) The Stncture of Agricultural Sector: The creation of industrial 
eaployzent often induces migration of agricultural workers to the 
industrial sector. The effect of this migration on the shadow wage is 
determined, in part. by how the welfare of those who remain in the 
agricultural sector is influenced by the general eq11ilibri11111 consequences 
of aigration on agricultural prices, wages and earnings. These. in turn, 
depend on the institutional mechanisms which allocate land. wort, and 
output among various individuals within the agricultural sector. Consider 
a simple example. If agricultural wages rise due to migration, then the 
(net) sellers of labor (landless workers and small landowners) gain. while 
the net buyers of labor (large landlords) lose. If the society is averse 
to inequality then, in this case, there may be a net social gain which 
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would reduce the magnitude of the shadow wage. We capture these effects 
in a aodel of an agricultural sector with heterogenous individuals in 
which the distribution of earnings is endogenously determined. 
(ii) The Industrial Sector: It has rece11tly been araued that there 
are important relationships between the wages paid to the imluatrial 
worker• and their H.! output. Several alternative explanations of such 
relationships have been offered~ wases may affect the quality of a 
firm's applicant pool, the efficiency with which a given worker works, or 
the workers' turnover rates. We represent the industrial sector in a 
manner that exhibits these effects. Our for1111lation is consistent with 
many alternative wage determination mechanisms, including those which take 
into account wage-productivity relationship. 
(iii) The Xigra tion of Labor between Sectors: The literature thus far 
has focussed primarily on two cases: where there is no endogenous 
migration or where the migration is governed by a Barris-Todaro type 
hypothesis. Our general model of migration subsumes these two cases. 
Also, our determination of the shadow wage takes into account many of the 
general equilibrium effects of endogenous migration which have often been 
ignored in earlier studies. 
(iv) Foreign Trade Environment: Kost studies on the shadow wage 
assuae an open economy in which there are no deviations between the 
domestic and the international prices. Empirical evidence on I.DCs, on the 
other hand, points out that there exist substantial price distortions. We 
therefore take into account such distortions and show that these 
distortions may exert a first order effect on the magnitude of the shadow 
wage. In addition, we examine the case in which the distortions are being 
s 
set at socially optimal levels, and analyze their implications for the 
shadow wage. le also consider the case in which the economy is closed to 
foreian trade. 3 
(v) Equilibrating Mechanisms in the Economy: The consequences of new 
employment creation depend on how the economy arrives at a new 
equilibri11&. 4 Bow the economy equilibrates, in turn, depends on which 
instr11ments can be potentially controlled by the government, which of 
these instr..ents are left unchanged when the new eaployaent is created, 
and how the govermnent changes the remaining instr..ents. There are two 
situations in which the issue of how the economy equilibrates may be 
ignored: first, if the government does not possess any instrmnent of 
control at all and, second, if the government sets every available 
instr11aent at its socially optimal level. Given the observed behavior of 
governments, both of these extremes appear unlikely. We therefore assess 
the impact of alternative equilibrating ■echanis■ s. 
(vi) Distributive Judgments: The evaluation of public projects 
depends both on illtertemporal and interpersonal trade-offs (that is, the 
social valuation of the income of different individuals relative to that 
of investment). These value judgments are represented in our formulae 
through clearly identifiable parameters. 
2. THE BASIC MODEL 
Rather than to begin with the general model, we first introduce a 
stripped-down version, to help focus ideas. Subsequent sections show how 
this basic model can be both generalized and specialized. In the model of 
an open economy described below, the goverDl!lent exercises its control on 
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the agricultural sector only indirectly. through (at DJ&t) the imposition 
of commodity taxes and subsidies on peasants' net surplus.S The govenunent 
propose, to undertake an industrial project which will create new 
employment. Our objective is to calculate the social cost (the shadow 
wage) of this employment creation.6 We ass1111e at present that there is no 
endogenous migration between the agricultural and the ind•strial sectors. 
the agricultural sector consists of homogene011s family farms. and the 
industrial wage is rigid. 7 Other specifications are considered later. 
Agricultural Sector: The agricultural sector's population is Nl, and 
A is total (agricultural) land which is owned equally within the 
agricultural sector.8 a"" A/Nl is land per worker, and Ll is the number 
of hours worked by each worker. The production technology exhibits 
constant returns to scale. Ye can therefore write: X =X(A/N1 , Ll) =X(a, 
Ll) as the output of an agricultural worker. An agricultural worker's 
consumption of agricultural and industrial goods is denoted by (xl, yl). 
The surplus of the agricultural good per agricultural worker is Q "" X ~ 
xl. The relative price of the agricultural good in terms of the 
industrial good is denoted by p. An agricultural worker's budget 
constraint is 
(1) 
A.Ji agricultural worker chooses xl, yl, and Ll, subject to the above 
budget constraint, to maxi~ize his utility. The resulting level of 
utility depends on p and Nl, and it is represented by the indirect 
7 
utility function: vl =vl(p, Nl). Then 
av1 1 av1 1 1(2) = 1 Q > o, and--..-= - 1 plaxa/N < O 
ap oN.1 
where •xa = olnX/olna is the elasticity of the agric11ltural output per 
worker with respect to the land per worker, and 1i is the (positive) 
aarginal utility of income to a worker in sector i. 
For later use, define 'Qp = olnQ/olnp, and •Qa = 81nQ/Blna as the 
elastic Hies of. the surplus per agricultural worker with respect to its 
price, and with respect to the land per agricultural worker. Though the 
usual restrictions on utility and production functions do not predict the 
sign of •Qp• we assume here that 'Qp > O. 'Qa depends on the scarcity of 
agricultural land. If land is not scarce, then •Qa = 0, and sxa = O. For 
brevity in interpreting our results, we assume throughout that 1 > IQa 2 
0, that is, land is moderately scarce. The modifications for other values 
of elasticities are straightforward. 
Industrial Sector: Industrial population is Nl. Ye ass1111e that an 
industrial worker supplies L2 hours of work which are fixed due to 
technological considerations; a JDOre general case, however, can be 
easily worked out. An industrial worker's cons11111ption of agricultural and 
industrial aoods is denoted by (x2, y2), and w ia his ,rage income in terms 
of the industrial good. The budget constraint of an industrial worker is 
(3) px2 + y2 = Y 
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AD industrial Yorker chooses x2 and y2 to maximize his utility. Since 
L2 is fixed, ye yrite the indirect utility as: y2 s y2(p, y). Then 
av2 2 2(4) > 0, and - = - Ax < 0 
2 2 2 2 .Define exp c -alnx /8lnp, and Bxy c a1nx /8lnY as the 
elasticities of an industrial yorker's consumption of the agricultual 
good with respect to its price, and with respect to wage income. These 
elasticities are positive because the consUllption goods are assumed to be 
normal. 
The output of an industrial worker is Y c Y(k, L2), where ks K/N2 is 
the capital stock per industrial worker, and I is the total industrial 
capital stock. There may be both private and public firms in the 
industrial sector, but all firms pay the same wage to their workers and 
the profits of private firms are entirely taxed away . . 
Market Eguilibri11111: N is the total population, and 
The supply of the industrial good is used either for cons11111ption or for 
investment, I. Bence 
Yhere My is the net import of the industrial good. Similarly, the 
9 
balance between the aupply and the demand of the agricultural good 
requires 
(7) 
where Xx is the net import of the agricultural 1oocl. The foreign tracte 
balance is given by 
where P denotes the international relative price of the agricultural good. 
P is fixed under the small country assumption, but this can be easily 
relaxed. 
For later use, we obtain an alternative expression for investment. 
Substitution of (1), (3), (7), and (8) in (6) yields 
That is, investment equals the retained part of the industrial output 
(after deducting industrial wage payment) and the net revenue from trlcle 
taxes. 
Eguilibratipg Mechanism: Creation of industrial employment changes 
the sectoral populations which, in turn, alters the demand and supply of 
various goods. The social impact of employment creation thus depends on 
the particular equilibrating change which occurs. We asa11J11e here that the 
traded quantities, M and M, change to maintain the equilibrium
X y 
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between the supply and the demand of the agricultural good, (7), and 
investment changes to maintain the equilibrium in the industrial goods 
aarket. That is, the government does not change its tariff policy. 
Alternative equilibrating mechanisms are ezamined later. 
3. DETERMINATION OF THE SHADOW WAGE 
3A. Shadoy Jage in the Basic Model 
Define an additive Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function 
where I is concave and increasing in V. If 6 is the social value of the 
marginal investment, then the current value of the aggregate social 
welfare is given by the Hamiltonian 
(11) H = J + 61 
in which I is given by (9). 
If the shadow wage is denoted bys, then 
1(12) I c -
6 
The industrial good is the numeraire throughout the paper. The first term 
in (12) is the net social loss from employment creation. 9 The second 
11 
term represents the direct contribution of the newly employed worker. 
This contribution is excluded from the calculation of the shadow wage 
because the fruits of employment creation should not be counted Yhile 
computing its cost.10 
An explicit expression for (12) is derived from (11). 
(13) s = y - 1 Cw2 - w1] - ~l pXeX + (P - p)Z. Yhere r r a 
(14) Z = Q(l - •Qa) + x2 > 0 
To obtain the above expressions. ye have used (2), (4). and (S), and 
~i is social value (weight) of 
a marginal increase in the income of a yorker in sector i. 
Each of the four terms in the expression (13) represents a distinct 
social effect of moving an agricultural yorker to the industrial sector. 
The first term is the direct cost of the wage payment to the nnly 
employed industrial worker. Naturally. a larger aarket wage implies a 
larger shadow wage. The second teni captures the chanse in the welfare of 
the Yorker Yho has moved. The third term represents the effect of reduced 
congestion on agricultural land. Specifically, a migrant worker releases 
land area a. which adds plex1 to the income of those remaining in the 
agricultural sector. A higher congestion on agricultural land. therefore. 
corresponds to a lower shadow wage. 
The last term captures what we call the seneral equilibri•m effect of 
employment creation on the demand and supply of the agricultural good. 
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This can be seen as follows. The agricultural surplus decreases directly 
by Q because now there is one less agricultural worker. The agricultural 
surplus increases indirectly. on the other hand. by an amount QaQa because 
of the extra land which has now become available to those in the 
agricultural sector. Also, the newly arrived industrial worker cons1111es 
x2 of the agricultural good. The net shortfall in the supply of the 
agricultural good is therefore z. as in (14). which is met through 
increased imports. :&nploymept creatiop thus increases the pet 
agricultural imports. The gain or loss in the goverwnt revenue then is 
(P- p)Z. which is the last term in (13). 
lfuch of the literature on shadow ,rages has ignored this general 
equilibrium effect by assuming that there is no price distortion; that 
is.pc P. Empirical studies indicate, however, that not only is this 
ass11mption incorrect but, in fact. the price distortions in many 
11developing economies are often large.. Aho. if the government 'ire re to 
set the domestic prices at their socially optimal levels then, as we shall 
12see, the optimal prices generally entail price distortions. 
A simple example might help in understanding the practical 
consequences of price distortions. Suppose the domestic price of food is 
twice (half) the international price, and the ,rorkers spend roughly half 
of their income on food. Then. ass11ming that investment is highly scarce 
(that is 6 is very large), that the agricultural land is not scarce. and 
that the ,rorkers' earnings in the two sectors are roughly equal. we find 
from (13) that the shadow wage is half (twice) the market wage. In 
contrast, the shadow wage equals the market wage if the general 
equilibrium effects are ignored. Quite plausible parameters therefore 
13 
show that the magnitude of the shadow wage will be substantially erroneous 
if this general equilibrium effect is not taken into account. 
3B. Special Cases 
Many of the results which have been prominent in the literature - and 
some new results which have not previously been noted - can be obtained as 
special cases of the ezpression (13). The specializations entail various 
specific assumptions concerning the technology and the nature of 
government policy. 
(i) Highly Scarce Capital: In this case, 6 is very large, and 
(lS) s Cw+ (P - p)Z 
If the capital is highly scarce, then the shadow wage is higher 
(lower) than the market wage if the domestic price of the agricultural 
good is lower (higher) than its international price, Obviously, the 
shadow wage equals the market wage if there are no price distortions. 
(ii) No Price Distortions: A direct implication of (13) is that: 
ln the absence of price distortions. the shadow wage is less than the 
aarket wage. so long as industrial workers are better-off than 
acricultural workers, Other special cases considered below alao employ 
the assumption of no price distortions. 
(iii) Utilitarianis~: Utilitarianism implies that yi c v1, and ~i = 
Ai. Denote the value of the marginal product of an agricultural worker by 
,_13 . ,_ X..LlTha t 1s, g = P-i, • Constant returns to scale in agricultural 
production implies l = l 8 + I L1 and, hence,a L 
14 
pXeXa cpl - g. Then,(13) can be written as 
(16) • Cw_ 1 cv2 _ v1 1 - 11 (pX - g)
6 6 
Thia corresponds to a result obtained by Little and Mirrlees (1968). Sten 
(1972). and Newbery (1972). 
(iv) Fixed Labor Hours: If the labor hours supplied by an 
agricultural worker are fixed and equal to the hours supplied by an 
industrial worker. then the utility of an agricultural worker can be 
expressed as a function of his income and the price he faces. that is: v1 
c V(p,pl) and v2 = V(p,w). Moreover, I is concave in a worker's income. 14 
Expression (13) then yields 
(17) 
Thus, the shadow wage exceeds a weighted average of the market wage and 
the margipal product of an agricultural worker. 
(v) Output Maximizing Society: In addition to the ass1111ptions aade 
in (iv) above, if it is assumed that a society aaxiaizes the level of its 
aggregate output without distinguishing between investment and 
consumption. or between the consuaption of different workers. then Y 
15equals a worker's income, and 6 equals one. Thus the inequality in (17) 
is replaced by an equality, and 
lS 
(18) s = g 
That is, the shadow wage equals the value of the marginal product of an 
agricultural worker. This was one of the earliest views on the magnitude 
of the shadow wage. This view implied a zero shadow wage, if the marginal 
product of agricultural labor ia zero. 16 
4. LABOR JIOBILITY, INDUSTRIAL WAGE. AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY 
4A. A Geperal Model 
Unemployment and endogenous mobility of workers sectors areacross 
COIDJIIOD features of many developing economies. We propose here a general 
11odel of labor mobility which subsuie~ many of the existing aodels. The 
utility level of an unemployed worker is denoted by VU, and the nuiber of 
unemployed is denoted by NU. For simplicity, transfer arrangements from 
the employed to the unemployed workers are ignored here, and it is ass'llllled 
that the unemployed workers have a fixed level of utility. 
The agricultural population is expressed (in a reduced form) as a 
function of the relative price and the level of industrial employment. 
(As explained later in footnote 18, the dependence of N1 on w is alre.ty 
i11plicit in the above expression). Obviously then. the level of 
llJlemployment is also a function of p and N2, since 
16 
Next. consider the determination of industrial wages. There are 
several alternative hypotheses concerning how the industrial wage is 
determined. To obtain an integrated view of the implications of these 
alternative hypotheses on the shadow wage, we represent the industrial 
wage schedule through the following reduced form function. 17 
It can be verified that the above reduced form representations of 
labor mobility and industrial wage determination take into account the 
1 18relationship between N and w. Also, note that (21) is consistent with 
the view that the government cannot perfectly control the level of 
industrial wage, or with the view that if the govermient is setting the 
wage optimally, then the optimal waae may depend on other variables in the 
economy.19 
Many recent theories have suggested that the productivity of 
industrial workers might depend on other variables in the economy, such as 
the industrial wage and the rate of unemployment. Such a dependence is 
represented as 
where the first two arguments of the function Y continue to represent the 
direct effect of the capital and labor hours on industrial productivity, 
17 
while the last two argumeDts reflect all of the indirect effects.20 
An advantage of using general functions like (19), (21), and (22) is 
that the resulting shadow wage formulae are quite free of the precise 
nature of the institutions in the economy. (The values of parameters in 
these formulae would, of course, depend on the institutions.) As we shall 
see below, these functions are easily specialized to represent various 
specific hypotheses. 
For later use, we define the following elasticities. From (22), 'Ye 
E dlnY/dinN2 is the elasticity of per worker industrial output with 
respect to industrial employment. Given that the price is fixed in the 
present model, this elasticity captures all of the indirect effects of the 
perturbation in the economy on industrial productivity. From (19), n = 
-dN1/dtt' is the nuber of workers who leave the a1ricultural sector if one 
industrial job is created. And, from (21), e E dlnw/dlntt' is the·we 
elasticity of industrial wage with respect to industrial employment. 21 
The relevant Hamiltonian is given by (9) and (11) in which 
and N1 • 1r and Y are given by (19), (21) and (22) respectively. We derive 
the corresponding shadow wage according to (12). This can be rearranged 
to yield 
(24) we - Ye we Ye 
18 
where 
The expression (24) reduces to (13) if n 1, •Ye 0, and •we O.s c s 
That is: If the level of unemployment is left unchanged by the creation 
of industrial employment, if t.he industrial wage is fbed, and if here are 
no indirect effects on imustrial productivity, then the above shado,.. wage 
is the same as that derived in the basic 11odel. Thus, the model in 
Section 3 and its specializations can be viewed as special cases of the 
more general model presented here. 
The effect of employment creation on labor mobility and the effect of 
this on the shadow wage can be decomposed into three parts. First, n 
migrants from the agricultural sector join the pool of unemployed and; 
is the net loss in the welfare for each worker, after taking into account 
the gain from reduced congestion on agricultural land [see (25)]. The 
welfare loss is thus •n/6 in (24). Second, one of the unemployed 
workers receives the newly created industrial job, and the welfare gain 
due to this is¼ [w2 - WU]. Third, labor mobility influences the 
shortfall Zin the aaricultural good, This can be seen in (26), in which 
Q{l - •Qa>n is the decrease in agricultural supply. 
The effect of employment creation on the imustrial waae is felt 
through Ewe· If, for example, the industrial wage increases with 
industrial employment, then the new project will increase the wage payment 
to the infr1J11arginal industrial workers, This, in turn, makes them 
19 
better-off, but at the expense of public revenue. The net of these two 
effects is represented in the fifth term in (24'). The induced change in 
the industrial wage also affects the net shortfall in agricultual good, 
as can be seen in the express ion (26). Finally, the loss or gain due to 
the indirect effects on industrial productivity is represented by the last 
term in the right hand side of (24'). 
4'B. Barris-Todaro Misration Hypothesis 
A special case of the above general aodel of labor mobility is the 
Barris-Todaro hypothesis [Barris and Todaro 0970)), according to which a 
aigrant from the agricultural sector finds an industrial job with 
probability N2/(N - Nl), and becomes unemployed otherwise. Migration 
continues until the expected utility level of a potential migrant equals 
the utility level of an agricultural worker. This hypothesis is therefore 
a special case of (19) in which 
where, it will be recalled, vl is a function of p and Nl, and v2 is a 
fllDction of p and w. For simplicity, we assume here that the social 
welfare function is utilitarian, that is, Y(V) c V and pi c Ai. While a 
■ore aeneral approach is easily possible, as we shall see later, this 
assumption enables us to ignore here the issue of defining the social 
welfare over the ex ante versus the ex post utilities of workers. Also, 
to keep N'll positive, we ass'DJlle that y2 > v1 > vu. The above model is not 
meaningful otherwise. 
Perturbing (27), we obtain 
20 
(28) 
Substitution of the above in (24) yields 
(29) 
where Z is given by (26). 
On comparing (29) with the earlier expressions for the shadow wage. 
(13) and (24), it is clear that the shadow wage now does not depend on 
the differences in the utilities of different workers. This is what we 
would espect since all workers have the same expected utility in the 
present mode1.22 
Special Cases: {i) Consider the special case in which there is no 
congestion on agricultural land, there are no induced effects of 
employment creation on industrial wage and productivity, and the domestic 
price equals the international price. Then, from (29), the shadow wage 
equals the market ,rage. regardless of the society's valuation of 
investment versus consumption. This well known result 23 reversed the 
presu.mption of the earlier literature that the shadow wage is smaller than 
the ■ arket wage, that its value is critically dependent on the society's 
iJl.tertemporal valuation, and that it approaches the market waae only when 
the social value of investment (relative to cons1111ption) is very high. 
The basic reason for this result is that the migration in the 
present special case does not change the aggregate level of utility or 
consUJDption in the economy and, hence, the only effect of employment 
21 
creation is on investment. The utility level of an agricultural worker is 
fixed. since •xa "' o. and the utility level of an industrial worker is 
fised. since there is no effect of migration on the aggregate expected 
utility. Since the only effect of creating an industrial job is on 
investaent (which. from (9). is reduced by the market waae), it follo,,s 
that the shadow wage equals the market wage. 24 
(ii) Consider an output maximizing society with land congestion, in 
which there are no price distortions, and there are no induced effects on 
industrial wage and productivity. Recall that the output maximization 
i11plies ~l c 6"' 1, v1 = pX, and v2 = w. Substitution of these in (28) and 
(29) yields 
Thus. s < w, since aXa < 1 from the standard properties of production 
function. This result shows, in a simple setting, that the effect of land 
congestion is to reduce the shadow wage. 25 
5. INDUSTRIAL WAGE DETERMINATION 
Nany recent studies have postulated that the net output (net of 
hiring and training costs, for example) of an industrial firm aay be a 
function of, among other things, the wage this firm pays. the wages other 
firms pay. and the level of industrial 11nen1ployment: and that these 
effects, in turn, influence the wages that are paid to workers. 26 In 
22 
this section, we show how these wage determination mechanisms can be 
treated as special cases of the model presented earlier. We also show 
that our •odel can be employed to study wage determination in aany more 
institutional settings than those considered in the existing literature. 
Kost of the general points can be established in the context of the 
wage-productivity hypothesis. This hypothesis suaaests that the 
27efficiency per work hour, b, depends on the wage ; that is, b c b(w), 
where b > 0 is the relevant range, and Y c Y(k, bL2 ). The institutionalw-
setting which has be&n emphasized in the literature is the one in which 
private industrial firms minimize the labor cost per efficiency unit, 
2w/b(w)L , and the resulting wage is characterized by 
(31) b c b/ww 
Thus: The level of the efficiency wage paid by firms is a fixed 
technological parameter. The substitution of ewe c O and 8Te c O in (24) 
yields the corresponding shadow wage. 
Now consider an alternative institutional setting in which the 
industrial firms are publicly owned (that is, the level of industrial 
eaployment is publicly determined) and the govermient instructs firms to 
maximize their profits (this directive aay not always be socially optimal, 
as we shall soon see). The firms then maximize (Y - w), and the 
industrial wage is characterized by 
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where YL = ay/a(bL2 ). Clearly in this case the industrial wage depends 
on the level of industrial employwient. The induced effect on productivity 
is represented by eYe c &yLebwewe' where 'YL c a1nY/a1n(bL
2 
), and 'bw c 
a1nb/alnY. Substitution of these in (24) yields the correspondin& shadow 
wage. 
If, on the other hand, the government sets the optiaal wa1e taking 
into account the wage-efficiency effects then, •sing the relevant 
Hamiltonian, it can be verified that the optimal waae depends on the 
variables in both sectors of the economy and that, in general, the 
resulting wage schedule does not entail an equalization of the social 
weight on investment,&, and the social weight on the income of an 
industrial worker ~2.28 
For illustration, consider the simple cue in which there is no 
price distortion, and there is no endogenous migration. The socially 
optimal industrial wage is then obtained from (9), (10) and (11) as 
(33) 
Clearly, P2 does not always equal 6 because of the wage-efficiency 
effects. Now consider two further special cases in which the social 
weiahts are exogenously specified. First, if 6 is very large relative to 
6, then (32) and (33) are the same. This should not be surprising, since 
if the society maximizes investment, then the optimal wage paid by the 
government is the same as what it would be if public sector managers are 
2instructed to maximize their profit. Second, if ~ c &, then (33) yields 
bw c O. Thus, in an output maximizing society, the optimal industrial 
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wage is sufficiently high, so that the effects of wage on productivity do 
not exist anymore. It follows in the present case, then, that the optimal 
industrial wage is higher in an output maximizina society than what it is 
in an investment ■ aximizing society, or in an econcimy in which private 
finis minimize the cost of labor in efficiency units. 
For other hypotheses concerning industrial waae 4etemiaation, the 
relevant issues are quite similar to those already 4iscusaed aboTe. For 
instance, the wage-quality hypothesis posits that the wage paid by a firm 
(relative to other firms and relative to the agricultural sector) induces 
a sorting of workers according to their quality. If the private finis 
minimize their unit cost of labor in efficiency units then, in a sym•tric 
equilibri11m, the wage is given by (31), where b c b(w, N2). 29 Clearly, 
therefore, employment creation has an induced wage effect as well as an 
indirect effect on productivity. 
Similarly, according to the labor-turnover hypothesis, the training 
cost to a firm (which reduces its net output) depends on the quit rate of 
workers. If private firms minimize their total labor cost then, in a 
symnetric equilibrium, it turns out that the industrial waae depends on 
urban unemployment rate and on the number of workers in the aaricultural 
sector. It is clear therefore, that this case as well as those arisina in 
alternative institutional settings, can be treated as special cases of the 
1110del developed in Section 4A. 
We have thus identified the properties of the industrial sector 
which are critical in the determination of the shadow wage, and have shown 
how the relevant reduced form expressions depicting the industrial wage 
schedule and the migration mechanism can be specialized to a variety of 
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technological, behavioral. and institutional hypotheses. The same reduced 
foni expressions (and therefore the same formulae for the shadow wage) are 
consistent with quite different technological and behavioral 
a11uptions; while the same technological ass1111ptions, in conjunction 
with different behavioral postulates, yield aarkedly different shadow 
wases. 
6. STIUCI'URE OF THE AGJUCULTUJW.. SECTOI 
Our earlier specifi_otion that the agricultural sector consists of 
homogenous fuiily farms is restrictive. A full investigation of the 
impact that alternative institutional structures within the agricultural 
sector have on the shadow wage requires a more detailed model containing, 
among other things. different classes of individuals (landowners, 
sharecroppers and landless workers, for exaaple), the migration behavior 
of these classes, the reallocation of land entailed by migration, the 
mechanisms which determine agricultural wages and earnings, and the tax 
instruments which the government employs in the aaricultural sector. A 
perturbation of such a model due to industrial employment creation would 
thus affect not only the distribution of welfare within the aaricultural 
sector, but also the agricultural surplus and the level of public 
investment. 
For instance, if agricultural wages increase due to a reduction in 
the agricultural population then, as we pointed out earlier, the net 
sellers of labor gain whereas the net buyers of labor lose. If the 
economy is closed to international trade (discussed later in Section 8) 
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then a project has general equilibrium price effects; if the prices of 
agricultural goods increase, then the net sellers of these goods gain 
whereas the net buyers lose. Also, migration aay affect the distribution 
of rents and profits associated with land-ownership, particularly if the 
new project induces some of the landowners to migrate to the urban sector. 
The precise consequences of this would depend, of course, on the 
blstitutional arrangements; in some economies, migrants do not lose 
their right to receive 'rents' from their land, while fn others they do. 
In addition, there may be induced effects on individuals' incentives (and 
hence on their surplus and welfare) which are determined, in part, by the 
rules for sharing output and work within families and between landowners 
30and sharecroppers. 
In the remainder of this section we focus on the distributional 
consequences of changes in agricultural wages and profits. Specifically, 
we reconsider the basic model (Section 2) with the following modifications 
concerning the agricultural sector. 
(i) Betero1enous Farmers: Consider an agricultural sector 
consisting of a spectrum of landowning classes as well as landless 
lbworkers, who buy and sell their labor services. N denotes the 
aaricultural population in group h. An individual in group h has land 
area Ah, and his net labor supply (that is, labor hours supplied minus the 
labor hours employed on his farm) is L1h. The landless workers are 
denoted by h = I. Clearly, A1 = 0, and L11 > O. The newly created 
industrial job is awarded to one of the landless workers, and the 
populations of various landownin1 groups remain unchanged. The schedule 
1 1 11of the rural wage rate (per hour) is represented as w = w (p, N ). 
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Its elasticity with respect to the population of landless workers is 
1 1denoted as , c -dlnw1/dlnN11 • N Q continues to denote the total we 
agricultural surplus, where N1 = 2 Nlh is the total agricultural 
h 
population, and Q is the average agricultural surplus per member of the 
agricultural population. 
ne fist term in the right hand side of the social welfare function 
(10) now becomes: L N1hwcv1h(p, w1)), and the corresponding shadow wage 
h 
is given by 
(34) s = w - t [w2 - t 11 J + (P - p}Z + c 
where 
1 1(35) C = - 1 W Il>" we 
ne new term c, in (34} and (35), represents the induced effects of 
industrial employwient creation OD the distribution of welfare in the 
agricultural sector. We assume here that the a1ricultural wage rate 
1increases if there are fewer landless workers, that is, a > O. (As we we 
shall see below, this assumption is justified under certain plausible 
conditions.) nen, (34) and (35) show that the induced gains to the net 
suppliers of labor reduce the shadow wage, whereas the induced losses to 
the net buyers of labor increase the shadow wage. This is what we would 
have expected based on our earlier discussion. 
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Though the above derivation of the shadow wage is consistent with a 
variety of mechanisms for agricultural wage determination, we foc~s on the 
case where the wage is determined from a clearing of agricultural labor 
•arket, that is, from 
(36) L Nl~lh(p, wl) = 0 
h 
If household h supplies L1 h hours of labor, and Ld hours of labor are used 
on a unit land, then L1h = Lsh - A~d. Denote e~! = 81nL1 h/81nw1 as 
dthe elasticity of labor supply for household h, and eLw 
81nLd/81nw1 as the elasticity of labor demand on a unit land. Then a 
1 11perturbation of (36) with respect tow and N yields 
1(37) e!e c t 11 t} _r- h(Lsht~! + A~defw> 
h 
It follows that a sufficient set of assumptions for (37) to be positive is 
that the individuals' labor supplies are nondecreasing in the wage rate, 
31and that the farm use of labor is decreasing in wage rate. But even if 
the labor supply curve is backward bending, (37) will still be positive, 
provided increases in wage do not induce too large a reduction in labor 
supply. This assumption seems plausible, and we make it in the rest of 
this section. 
A special case worth noting here is that of an agricultural sector 
consisting of two classes: landless workers and landlords (denoted by h: 
11 2 12 •2). Then from (36), t = -/ t Substituting this in (35), we obtain 
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This expression is quite intuitive since in the two class case. the 
induced wage gain to the landless is exactly equal to the loss to the 
landlords. If the society is averse to inequality (that is~ is 
decreasing in income), 32 then a net social 1ain arises from this induced 
transfer from the poor to the rich. From (34) and (38), therefore, the 
resulting social gain reduces the shadow wage. 
(ii) Land Rents: If the government captures some of the profits 
(rents) in the agricultural sector, then the public revenue (and, hence, 
the shadow wage) will be influenced by migration. For brevity. we 
consider here a polar case in which the agricultural sector is organized 
through government-owned parutetals, or through privately o,rned 
parutatals whose profits are entirely taxed ayay. N1 denotes the 
population of homogenous agricultural workers. each of whom works for L1 . 
hours and receives a wage rate w1 per hour. The profit in agriculture is 
N1(pX - w1L1 ), and this profit is now added to the investinent expression 
(9). The resulting shadow wage is given by (34), where now 
(39) 
where aiw c BlnL1/Blnw1 is the labor supply elasticity of an 
agricultural worker. 33 
The first term in the right hand side of (39) represents the induced 
waae effect which we had investigated earlier. In fact, this term is 
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quite similar to the corresponding expression (38) in a two-class 
agriculture. This should not be surprising since, in the present model, 
the aoverDJDent acts as the 'landlord•. 34 (p1i_ - w1 ) is the marainal 
profit (wbich could be positive, zero or negative) from an hour of labor. 
The second term in the right hand side of (39), therefore, represents the 
loas of profit due to the migration of one agricultural worker, and due to 
effect that this migration may have on the labor hours supplied by those 
who remain in the agricultural sector. Next, the labor aarket clearing 
N1L1 1condition (36) n0,r becomes: = ALd. This yields: e we 
d 1 1 d 1 
1Lw) > O, and (l - 1Lw 1we) = 1 Lw/(eLw + '~-) > o. 35 From 
(34) and (39), therefore, we obtain the following result. 
If there are no price distortions, if ipvestaent is highly scarce, 
and if agricultural workers are paid po more than their ■ arginal product, 
then the shadoy wage is higher than the market wage. The reasoning is 
simple. The migration of an agricultural worker, in the present case, 
implies that the govermnent not only pays a higher wage to those who 
remain in the agricultural sector, but it also loses some profit because 
the total number of agricultural labor hours have decreased due to 
migration. 36 The conventional belief that the shadow wage equals the 
aarket wage when there is no distortion and when investment is scarce, 
therefore, is incorrect in the present case. 
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7. SHADOW WAGE WI'Ill OPTIMAL PRICES 
Throuahout our analysis, we have stressed the importance of the 
deviation between the domestic and the international prices in the 
determination of the shadow waae. Our results are valid reaardless of hoY 
the domestic prices are deterained, 10 lona as they do not change as the 
industrial employment is created. We now examine h01r the doaestic prices 
would be set if they were being determined optimally, and ,rhat the optimal 
prices, in turn, imply for the shadow wage. 
For brevity, consider the basic model of the agricultural sector 
(Section 2), ignore the induced effects on industrial productivity, and 
asslllle utilitarianism and the Barria-Todaro hypothesis. (A more general 
analysis is easily possible.) The industrial wage is given by (21). 
Differentiation of the relevant Hamiltonian, given by (9), (11) and (23), 
with respect top, characterizes the optimal rate of subsidy on the 
agricultural surplus as 
tl N2w 
P - P = t N(Q - Iexamp> - P £,rp + Mx(.40) 
P N1Q &Qp + N2x2i~p 
In the above expression, we have defined the following elasticities. 
From (19), m c d1~1/dlnp is the elasticity of the agriculturalp 
population with respect to the relative price and, from (21)# a ~ 
YI) 
dlnw/dlnp is the elasticity of industrial wage with respect to price. 
aQp = dln(N1Q)/dlnp = eQp + (1 - aQ )mp is the elasticity of total 
8 
agricultural surplus with 
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respect to its price. and i 2 : -dlnx2/dlnp = e2 e2 is thexp xp - XY e'WJ) 
own price elasticity of the consuption of agricultural good by an 
imdustrial worker. taking into account the induced effect of price on 
wage. It can be Terified from (27) that mp> o. and thus 'Qp > O. 
Expression (40) aay be substituted back into (29) to obtain an 
expression for the shadow wage. expressed in term of the •nderlying 
reduced form general equilibrhun parameters of the economy. 
Specialization of this general formula is a straightforward matter. Bere 
we show that, under certain circumstances. whether the doaestic price is 
hiaher or lower than the international price depends solely on the 
direction of trade flows. 
Specifically. if the induced effects on industrial wage and 011 
agricultural land congestion are not significant, that is, eXa and ewp are 
negligible, then (40) yields: p > P, if Mx l O. Alsop< P if M < 0,
X 
and if 6 is Tery large. That is: The optimal domestic price of the 
agricultural good is higher t)-'n its international price if the country 
imports this good, The reverse is true if the country exports the 
agricultural good, and if i11vestment is highly scarce. 
Combining the above results with (29), we find that, if the domestic 
price is being set optimally. then: The shadow yage is smaller thap the 
■ arket ,rage if th country imports the agricultural good, The reverse is 
tni, if the couptry exports the agricultural good and if ipvestment is 
highly scarce. 
Special case: Among the very few studies on the shadow wage which do 
not assue undistorted trade are those by Dixit and Stern. 37 They 
I 
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consider a model in which the society maximizes investment, there is no 
endogenous migration, the industrial wage equals agricultural income, and 
the agricultural output does not depend on its price. that is: 6 ➔ m, 
1 as 1. • c O, w cpl, and X c X(N ). These asslllllptions also imply:p 
1,rp s 1, and 1~p c (I - x2 )aQp/x2. Substitution of these in (40) yields the 
result: 
(41) 
8. ALTERNATIVE EQUILIBRATING MECHANISMS 
There are two main points concerning how the shadow wage is affected 
by the mechanism which brings the economy back into a (new) equilibrium 
after a project is undertaken. First, alternative equilibrating 
mechanisms, in general, entail different social costs38 and, hence, imply 
different shadow wages. Second, if all of the available policy 
instr'llJllents are set at their socially optimal levels, then altenative 
equilibrating mechani.s11s imply the same shadow wage. Though l>oth of these 
points hold in more general models, we examine them here in the context of 
the simple model outlined in Section 2. 
We have assumed so far that the traded quantities change in response 
to the creation of industrial employment, while the domestic prices remain 
1J.J1chuged. Now consider an altenative mechanism in which a change in 
domestic prices equilibrates the economy, while the traded quantities 
39remain unchanged. A closed economy is clearly a special case of the 
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present formulation, since the traded quantities are always zero in such 
an economy. 
Using (7), the expression for investment, (9) can be restated as 
in which Mx is assumed to be fixed. In addition, equation (7) now 
represents an explicit constraint on the economy. The industrial 
employment creation, therefore, must be accompanied by a price change so 
that this constraint remains satisfied. Expression (◄ 2) along with (10), 
defines the Hamiltonian (11), and 
The middle term in the above expression is new, in comparison to (12). 
This term represents the indirect loss in social welfare due to the change 
in price which keeps (7) in balance. 
A perturbation of (7) yields 
(◄ 4) = pZ 
where recall that Z is the shortfall between the demand and supply of the 
agricultural good, induced by the industrial job creation. Z is given by 
(14), and it is positive. Therefore: The creatiop of ipdustrial 
emploV111ent is accompanied by an increase ip the price of the agricultual 
good, if a chapge in the domestic price~ is the equilibrating pechanism. 
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Using (43) and (44), ye obtain the folloying expression for the 
shadow wage. 
(45) where 
(46) t c ! [N2~2x2 - Nl~lQ - 6Mx ] 
6 N1QeQp + N2x2 aip 
Now contrast (13) and (45). The two expressions for the shadow waae are 
based on the same underlying model, but they differ in their equilibrating 
mechanisms. Not surprisingly, therefore, the only difference between the 
expressions (13) and (45) is in their last term which, as we saw earlier, 
represents the social cost of meeting the shortfall, Z. 
Specifically, in (13) the shortfall is removed through increasean 
in the net agricultural import and, as one would expect, the social cost 
of meeting a unit of shortfall is simply (P - p). In the present case, an 
increase in the price of the agricultural good removes the shortfall, and 
the social cost of meeting a unit of shortfall is t, given by the 
expression (46). To understand this expression, note that a price 
increase hurts industrial workers, helps agricultural workers, and 
increases (decreases) the public revenue if the net agricultural import is 
positive (negative). Each of these three effects have societal 
consequences which are seen clearly in the numerator of the square bracket 
in (40). 
Next consider the case in which the government sets the available 
policy instrwnents at their optimal levels. It is intuitive that in this 
case the social cost of alternative adjustment policies will be equalized 
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and, thus, the shadow wage would be the same under alternative 
equilibrating mechanisms. This intuition can be verified as follows. If 
we derive the opti~al price in the present model, foll01ring the approach 
of Section 7, then we find that the optimal price is characterized by 
(47) P - p a:: t 
where tis given by (46). Thus, the social costs of meeting the 
shortfall, and the shadow wage, are the same under the two equilibrating 
mechanisms we have considered. 
We now examine two special cases of (45). 
(i) Highly Scarce Invest~ent: In this case, (45) and (46) yield 
(48) s = w -
Thus, whether the shadow wage is higher or lower than the aarket wage 
depends simply on whether the country exports or imports the agricultural 
aood. This is because the only relevant gain or loss from the 
equilibrating price increase in this case is due to the change in 
investment, given by (42). If Mx is positive then the society gains, and 




(ii) Closed Economy: If the economy is closed to international 
trade, or if it is nearly self-sufficient, then W = O. From (46),
X 
2 1 2therefore, t = p(~ - ~ )/6(£Qp + £ 
xp 
), which is negative if the 
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agricultural workers are worse-off than the industrial workers.41 
Substituting this in (45), we obtain the following result: Ip a closed 
ecopomy. if the agricultural workers are worse-off than the ipdustrial 
workers, then the shadow wage is saaller thap the market yage. 
The intuition behind this result is quite clear. If agricultural 
workers are worse-off, then industrial employaent creation yields a direct 
welhre gain to those who receive the newly created Jobs, and it yields an 
indirect welfare gain to those who remain in the agricultural sector due 
to an increase in the price of agricultural good, and due to the reduced 
congestion. These two effects lead to a reduction in the shadow wage. 
A further special case of a closed econOllly is one in which investment 
is highly scarce. In this case, (48) yields: s cw. That is, the shadow 
wage equals the market wage. This has an interesting implication. The 
conventional belief that the shadow wage equals the market wage can be 
interpreted as a limiting case (of highly scarce investment) in an open 
economy without trade distortions, as well as in a closed economy. 
9. REMARKS 
(i) When individuals' migration decisions are based on expected 
utilities, then the shadow wage may be affected by whether the social 
welfare is calculated on the basis of the ex ante or the ex post utilities 
of individuals. -12 Consider the simple exa11ple of the Barris-Todaro 
hypothesis with no land congestion, and no induced effect on the 
industrial wage. Expression (23) is the social welfare of individuals 
based on their ex post utilities. Expressions (23) and (28) yield: 
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dJ/dtil c (W2 - ,u, - {(W1 - yu)(V2 - vu)/(v1 - vu)}. Since, 2 > v1, thev 
last expression is negative (zero) if Y is strictly concave (linear) in V. 
Tlie social welfare of individuals based on their ex ante utilities, on the 
other hand, is Jc Nl'(V1 ); and thus: dJ/dtil c O. Using these 
derivations it can be verified that if the society is averse to 
inequality, then the shadow wage co.rresponding to. a social welfare 
function based on ex post utilities is higher than that corresponding to a 
social welfare function based on ex ante utilities; and that the two 
shadow wages are equal if the society is utilitarian.43 Tlie reason is 
simple. In the present case, all individuals have the same ex ante 
utilities. but the pool of unemployed becomes larger when new industrial 
jobs are created. There is an added social cost, therefore. if the 
individuals' ex post utilities matter to the society. 
(ii) We have emphasized above that the shadow wage depends on the 
equilibrating mechanisms within the economy. There are some other 
possibilities which might be important in this context. First, it is 
possible in some cases that a government manages its pol icy instruments 
in a manner such that some markets do not clear. As an extreme example, 
if a government creates industrial employment without allowing other 
variables (such as prices or traded quantities) to change, then a 
shortage of food might emerge in cities. The government aay then attempt 
to remove this shortage through non-price methods such as rationing and 
queues. The derivation of the shadow wage in such cases will have to take 
into account the non-price methods which are employed to arrive at the 
final quantity balances. 44 
39 
Second, the economy may be in a temporary equilibrium such that some 
of the prices are rigid and some of the markets, other than that for 
labor, are characterized by excess supply or demand. In such cases, it is 
necessary to base the shado..,, wage derivation on an explicit model of the 
short term equilibrium. 45 
(iii) The models we have analyzed can be easily enlarged to 
accommodate a multiplicity of goods, and to include additional instr11111ents 
of policy. For example, if the government can maintain different relative 
prices in the agricultural and the industrial sectors, denoted by p and 
q respectively, then it can be shown that the shadow wage in the basic 
model is given by (13), provided we replace tbe last term in the right 
hand aide of (13) by 
(49) (P - p)(Q - a dQ) ~ (P - q)x2 
da 
ne intuition is obvious. The govermnent' s gain or loss due to the 
general equilibrium effects on the demand and supply of the agricultural 
good is now valued differently in the two sectors. Moreover, (49) readily 
aeneralizes to the case of many goods if the prices and quantities are 
interpreted as vectors. We have developed such disaggregated models 
elsewhere [Sah and Stiglitz (1983, 1984b)] to study the design of taxation 
and pricing in U>Cs. 
JO. CONCLUSION 
While the importance of using shadow prices and wages in the 
evaluation of public expenditure and projects has been widely recognizee 
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in U>Cs. the correct magnitude of the shadow wage - and its relationship 
to the market wage - have remained controversial. The earliest studies on 
shadow wages focussed on rual unemployment (open or disguised) in IJ>Cs. 
and inferred from this that the opportunity coat of hirb.g new industrial 
workers was low. Sen (among others) though agreeing that the opportunity 
cost - in the sense of forgone output - might be low, contended that the 
shadow wage might nonetheless be high; wage payaents to additional 
workers required diverting resources from (relatively JDOre valuable) 
investment to consumption. If investment was very valuable, then the 
shadow wage equaled the market wage. 
This view, in turn, was criticized by Barberger and Stiglitz for 
ignoring the induced migration of agricultural workers to the industrial 
sector. If the workers earned fixed wages in the two sectors. then under 
the Barris-Todaro hypothesis that the expected wage in the industrial 
sector equals the agricultural wage, they showed that the shadow wage was 
equal to the market wage. regardless of the relative social ~•luation of 
investment. These earlier studies thus identified two of the iq,ortant 
determinants of the shadow wage - the nature of intertemporal trade-off 
and endogenous migration. 
In this paper, we present a framework for shadow wage determb.ation 
which. while incorporating the above issues. deals explicitly with many 
salient features of U>Cs which are important but have not received the 
attention they deserve. These include: (i) the differences between 
domestic and international prices, (ii) the equilibrating mechanisms in 
the economy which determine, for example. whether the general equilibriu~ 
impact of industrial employment creation is to increase the relative price 
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of the agricultural good or to increase its net import, (iii) the 
aechanisms which determine the distribution of earnings within 
agricultural and industrial sectors, and (iv) the consequences of 
industrial employment creation on those who remain in the aaricultural 
sector, for exU1ple, through what we identify as conaestion effects. 
Many of these aspects have first order effects on the ■ aanitude of shadow 
waae; to ignore them would lead to misleading results. 
Our method has been to identify those reduced form relationships for 
describing the economy which are central to the determination of shadow 
wage. We have shown how the same reduced form relationship (and hence the 
same fon:ulae for the shadow wage) can be specialized to different 
technological assuiptions (e.g., the nature of production relationships in 
the agricultural and industrial sectors) and institutional settings, as 
well as to different behavioral hypotheses. For example, our formulae for 
the shadow wage contain certain critical elasticities which can be 
specialized to alternative migration hypotheses (including the 
Barris-Todaro case) and to alternative hypotheses concerning wage 
determination (including those based on the wage-productivity and the 
labor turnover effects). 
This method has the virtue of analytical siaplicity because it 
provides an integrated view of the critical determinants of the shadow 
wage. We have, therefore, been able to derive earlier results on shadow 
wages as special cases of our formulae. Also, we have identified a nur.ber 
of new qualitative results concerning the relationship between the shadow 
wage and the Earket wage. 
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There are several limitations of our analysis which we have pointed 
out in the paper. In particular, we have examined only a limited set of 
rigidities; we have not considered, for exaaple, the possibility that 
markets other than that for labor may not clear. Also, our models of 
migration and the determination of workers' wages and eamings are 
essentially static. It is possible, for example, that the brunt of the 
effects of employment creation in one period are felt in the future. 
Aho, we have abstracted from the issues concerning savings and the 
alleged scarcity of capital in I.DCs. In this case, one needs to identify 
whether there is any market failure, other than a possible divergence 
between the interte11poral distribution of welfare generated by the market 
and that preferred by the social planner. Furthermore, bow individuals 
adjust their savings behavior to the government's action may depend 
critically on the source of the alleged market failure; for example, on 
the nature of problems associated with imperfect information and contract 
enforcement which might be responsible for the market failure. This, in 
turn, may have a bearing on the magnitude of the shadow wage. 
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FOO'INOTES 
• An earlier version of this paper was released as the National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1229, Cambridge, 1983. We 
thank two annonymous referees for their useful coament1. 
1. Though our models can be easily employed to analyze pricing and 
tuation in IJ>Cs [see Sah and Stiglitz (1983, 1984a, 1984b)] as well 
as the determinants of other shadow prices. 
2. These parameters, in principle, can be estimated. 
3. An open and a closed economy ere obviously two polar representations. 
In fact, a variety of trade related rigidities exist in .IJ>Cs. In Sah 
and Stiglitz (1983. 1984b), we discuss some of these rigidities in the 
context of pricing and taxation. 
4. The term 'equilibriu' does not necessarily imply a conventional 
lalrasian equilibriu; it also denotes temporary equilibria of the 
kind that have been recently investigated by Solow and Stiglitz 
(1968), Bennasey (1975), and ¥alinvaud (1977), among others. 
5. See Sah and Stiglitz (1984b) for a discussion of the econ011ic reasons 
behind the restrictions which IJ)Cs may face on the set of tax-price 
instruments they can employ. 
6. It might be useful here to clarify our usage of the term shadoJ wege. 
The shadow wage is a sU1111ary statistic which suis up all of the 
changes in the economy due to the creation of industrial employment, 
multiplied by the social marginal valuation of each of these changes. 
The shadow wage excludes the value of the direct output contributed by 
the newly employed workers. As ye shall see later, this statistic is 
much more general than another s1UU1ary statistic, opportunity cost of 
labor, often employed in the literature, which calculates the net 
change in the aggregate output due to employaent creation. 
7. A fixed (real) industrial wage is often justified on the basis of 
certain 11.Jlspecified institutional constraints. But, as ye shall see, 
it 11ay be consistent with particular versions of competitive wage 
determination when wage-productivity effects are taken bito account. 
8. Throughout the paper, superscript& i "" 1 and 2 de11ote the agricultural 
and the industrial sectors respec~ively. 
9. Our analysis focusses on evaluating projects which are of sufficiently 
moderate size, so & can be taken as fixed. 
10. We exchide only tlie direct contribution, however. Thus, if industrial 
employment cre_ation has indirect repercussions on industrial output 
(for example, because of a change in workers' efficiency) then the 
indirect effects are not excluded. Such situations arise later in the 
paper. 
11. See Peterson (1979), and Bale and Lutz (1979), for example. 
12. Some models in which there are no restrictions on the govermient's 
ability to impose co1111odity 8Jld factors taxes might predict that there 
should be no distortions. See, for example, Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971). This is not the optimal policy, however, in the cases 
examined later in this paper, or in_ ■ore aeneral models, for example, 
in Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) and in Sah and Stiglitz (1983, 1984b). 
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13. The marginal product of an agricultural worker in this paper is the 
number of hours a worker works times the marginal product of one 
working hour. 
14. Ye assume here that the marginal utility of income is non-increasing 
in incoae. 
15. tJnder this set of assumptions. the opportppity coat of labor equals 
the shadow wage. 
16. Dixit (1968) studied a model without an agricultural sector. but with 
a reserve army of unemployed in the industrial sector. Members of 
this army are subsidized by their working colleagues, such that 
everyone consumes the same amount. wt'f/N. The indirect consmiption 
gain to the population from a job creation is w. It follows that the 
corresponding shadow wage is: s = w(l - A/6). 
17. ~han 0980) employs a similar representation of industrial wage iD the 
context of a trade model. 
18. Specifically, let N1 depend on all of the variables in the economy: 
l -1 u --'-tha t is • N c N (p. w. N • ~ ) • Similarly, in aeneral, w = w(p. 
11N1, N , N2-). These two expressions and (20), then. yield (19) and 
(21) under the conditions which allow the use of the iaplici t function 
theorem. If the econ011y has a wider set of variables then the above 
representations can be accordingly expanded. As an example. if there 
are different prices in the two sectors. then both of these prices 
will appear as arguents of (19) and (21). 
19. The •odel of migration proposed in this paper can be further exteJlded 
to an economy in which there are several regions which differ from one 
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another in resources (e.g., land, population, and skills of workers), 
in institutions (e.g •• how workers' earnings are determined), and in 
tax regimes (i.e., workers in different reaions face different 
prices). 
20. The dependence of industrial productivity on other Tariables in the 
economy is implicit in (22), throuah an argument similar to that in 
footnote 18. Also, note that (22) is an aagregation over firms' 
production functions, each of which can be written (in a symmetric 
equilibrium) as: yf = yf(kf, L2 , p, tr), where the superscript f 
denotes a firm, and kf is a firm's capital per worker. In a more 
general model, yf will also be a function of the entire distribution 
of industrial wages. 
21. We should emphasize that these are total derivatives. 
22. The expressions for tie shadow wage based on the Barris-Todaro 
hypothesis, such as (29) and those to be derived later, are aore 
general than they appear. This is because the only property of the 
migration hypothesis which has been actually used here is that the 
social welfare can be represented by NV1• The resulting expressions 
for the shadow wage therefore hold under any migretiop mechanism, 
provided the society focusses its attention only on the welfare of 
agricultural workers. 
23. See Stiglitz (1971, 1974), Barberger (1971) and Heady (1981), among 
others. 
24. This result can be looked at in an alternative way in an output 
maximizing society (see the special case (v) in Section 3B) in which 
the earnings (consuption) of a worker in both sectors are fixed and, 
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therefore, a change in tbe investment is the same as a change in the 
output. The impact on the aggregate output of creating an industrial 
job in this econ0111y is the output of one agricultural worker times the 
number of such workers who migrate. Under the Barris-Todaro 
hypothesis, this product is just equal to the industrial wage. To see 
this in the simplest case in which everyone is risk-neutral. note 
1that: v = pl, v2 = w. and Vu= O. (28) then yields: n = w/pX. 
The loss in output is thus: npl = w. For a di1c~11ion of this simple 
case, see Stiglitz (1971, 1974). Our analysis in this paper is, of 
course, much more general and does not depend on these restrictive 
ass11111ptions. 
2S. See Stiglitz (1982a) for a parallel result. 
26~ See Stiglitz (19~1. 1974, 1982a, 1982b), and the references therein. 
27. Kore correctly, the productivity also depends on prices [see Sah and 
Stiglitz (1984b)]. This dependence is suppressed here because prices 
are fixed in the present model. 
28. Thia should be contrasted with standard models in which the social 
weights on public revenue and on the income of a person are equal if 
the income of this person can be controlled by the government. 
29. See Sti&litz (1982b). The wage-quality hypothesis has some additional 
COIIIJ)lexities. For example, if earnings vary across a1ricultural 
workers of different abilities, then the effect of a public project on 
the quality of agricultural workers also needs to be taken into 
account in calculating the shadow wage. 
30. For instance, if the output is equally shared among family members, 
then there is an attenuation of incentives due to the difference 
between the average product and the marginal product. and this 
attenuation will be affected if some of the family members migrate to 
cities. Note. however. that there is something slightly peculiar 
about such models which ass11111e that social customs dictate an equal 
sharing of output within a family. but that social customs can not. or 
do not, support efficient 'work-sharing'. 
L1131. If iadividuals' labor supplies are fixed and equal, then Lsh E , 
1Substitution of these and (36) in (37). yields: , we 
As is obvious, this elasticity does not depend on the 
land distribution within the agricultural sector. 
32. ip/av < 0, if Wis strictly concave and if the ass1111ption in footnote 
14 holds. 
11 1 · 1 1 133 •.Note that in (34), 1f is now W , and, in (39). 1 ·a::: -dlllw /dlnN • 
we 
34. Unlike (38). however, the first tera in the right hand side of (39) is 
positive if u I! > p,1 that is,. if invest•ent is socially sore valuable 
than an agricultural worker's income. 
35. It should be obvious that these signs are valid even if the labor 
1 clsupply is decreasing in the wage rate, provided 'Lw + 'Lw > O. 
36. In fact. our result holds even if the govermnent keeps the wage 
'llllchanged. provided agricultural workers are paid less than their 
■ arginal product. This can be seen directly from (34) and (39), by 
•~bstitutina a.,... 1 = o • 
,/· 
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37. Dixit (1971) and Dixit and Stern (1974). A related paper is by 
Newbery ( 1974) • 
38. Blitzer, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981) consider this iss11e in the 
context of the shadow foreign exchange rate determination. 
39. Of course. the aovenment can employ a combination of equilibrating 
aechania11s. The resulting shadow ,rage for any such combination can be 
studied by examining the effects of each distinct mechanism. Note, 
however, that the equilibrating mechanism is not always a utter of 
choice for the aovenment. For example, if there are restrictions on 
t~e quantities that a country can export or import. then the relevant 
shadow wage is the one which is derived in this section. 
40. It should be obvious that the expression (45) holds for other 
equilibrating aechanis11s as well. The only paraeter which needs to 
be recalculated is t. 
41. See footnote 32. 
42. See Heady (1981) on this distinction. 
43. To see this. substitute (11) into (12), and note that only dJ/dtr' 
differs for the two alternative specifications under consideration. 
44. See Sah (1982) on the welfare i11Plications of alternative non-price 
instruments. 
45. See Roberts (1982) and Marchand. Mintz and Pestieau (1983), for 
example, on the shadow pricing in the context of a single sector 
economy in temporary equil ibriui. 
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